Analysis of "Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do" Essay Example

In his book titled Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do, Michael Sandel opposes the method of political liberalism because it sets aside moral and political obligations in exchange for the freedom of the individual. In opposition to John Rawls’s political justice Sandel claims, “I do not think that freedom of choice – even freedom of choice under fair conditions – is an adequate basis for a just society… it is not always possible to define our rights and duties without taking up substantive moral questions.” 

How can we settle on a form of government which sets aside our particular interests and advantages - behind a veil of ignorance – and abandons moral obligations and conceptions of the good life? From this point of view, Michael Sandel’s critique of John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism is that it prioritizes the freedom of choice over the good of society. The irony of Rawls’s hypothetical agreement is that his idea of a social contract is not an actual contract, it is based on voluntary consent. Sandel claims that “a hypothetical agreement cannot do the work of a real contract” and that “the principles of justice should not be derived from an agreement that ignores former principles of morality.” 

Principally, Sandel states that actual contracts derive their moral force from autonomy and reciprocity. But even though actual contracts rely on both conditions does not guarantee that they will produce fair terms: they may fail to meet terms of morality or consent. Additionally, consent between two parties does not suggest that there needs to be a moral obligation. Rawls would argue that equality and just terms in a social contract are enough by virtue of agreement alone. “Persons are situated differently,” Sandel states, and “differences in bargaining power and knowledge are always possible.”  If consent does not clarify the responsibilities or obligations of citizens then it follows that we don’t owe a moral responsibility, nor do we owe a natural duty to not commit injustice.

According to Rawls, the hypothetical agreement under the veil of ignorance ensures that an initial situation of equality leaves no room for any unfair advantages. For Rawls, an original position of equality guarantees that the terms of a social contract will be just because it is based on neutrality. Ideally, neutrality demands that political parties set aside all values, all ends, and beliefs at the front door to arrive at a form of agreement among political parties. The communitarian view, however, opposes political obligations based on neutrality. How can we set aside political obligations as members of a family, as citizens, or based on religious beliefs?

“Absent a political agenda that addresses the moral dimension of public question,” Sandel says, “and public attention becomes riveted on the private vices of public officials.”  Accordingly, leaving moral responsibilities and personal values at the door encourages a poor society. Sandel further claims that “The appeal of a neutral framework lies precisely in its refusal to affirm a preferred way of life or conception of the good.”  Although a form of government under the veil of ignorance pursues individual ends and the respect of individual rights, it does not assure that certain moral and religious values would outweigh its political values. 

Perhaps one way to defend Rawls’s political view is to ensure that the least advantaged are compensated for their position in society. Both of Rawls’s principles of equal basic liberties and the difference principle allow a basic structure in favor of the least advantaged. Rawls argues that, “The basic structure should allow organizational and economic inequalities so long as these improve everyone’s situation, including that of the least advantaged.”  But how do we know that the parties in the original position would choose the difference principle? How can Rawls know that the veil of ignorance would assure an equal society without high risk-takers? Even though Rawls objects to such risk-takers, Sandel would agree that, provided that different life situations may occur, real-life circumstances may incite individuals to opt for their own benefits over the common good.

Sandel disagrees with Rawls’s principle of equal basic liberties and the difference principle from a moral point of view. According to Sandel, Rawls’s position of justice from the egalitarian point of view “should abstract from, or set aside, contingent facts about persons and their social positions.”  Sandel disagrees and argues, “Won’t talented people who might have been [in high demanding lines of work] go into less demanding lines of work? …[and] what about effort?”  Should people not deserve the merits cultivated from their hard work?

Rawls’s principle of equality means the deprivation of moral merits. Rawls maintains that justice as fairness does not consider the rewarding of moral merits or virtue. On the other hand, Sandel believes that talents and unique gifts should be rewarded. How societies value certain qualities or talents is not a direct consequence of our own doing. For this reason, Sandel believes that Rawls’s principle of equality ignores moral desert and accidents based on the order of nature in exchange for equal distribution.

Upon further analysis, Sandel disagrees with Rawls’s conception of political liberalism because it prioritizes individual rights over the common good. Sandel sees that the notion of free and independent choice “supports the idea that the principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular moral or religious conception; instead, should try to be neutral among competing visions of the good life.”  Rawls’s idea that a person should be free to choose their ends for themselves denies a preferred way of life or conception of the good.

With a contract under the veil of ignorance, free agents set aside any particular interests and advantages in exchange for individual rights. Sandel believes that in order to maintain a just political order, we have to reason from the nature of the good life. “Freedom of choice – even freedom of choice under fair conditions – is not an adequate basis for a just society.”  Liberal justice requires that we respect people’s rights, but it does not propose that we advance toward the common good, even if this means denying moral principles. In addition, the liberal account fails to consider the moral responsibilities and obligations of citizens as a whole.