Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma in WW1 Essay Example

In the prisoner's dilemma and the security dilemma cooperation is unlikely and leads to unfavorable outcomes. This occurs because the payouts make it difficult for both states to cooperate. When looking at the choice resulting in the most favorable outcome altogether, then both states would choose to cooperate but, when states think of their individual needs, above the collective group, then it is rational for the party to choose to defect. It is troubling because there are mixed motives when dealing with the prisoners and security dilemmas. Collectively the most optimal outcome for all parties is if everyone was to cooperate. Logically, a state is going to choose the option that benefits them the most, making cooperation especially hard since the incentives of the prisoner's dilemma and the security dilemma individually benefit states who defect. This is why cooperation is so difficult in these situations. 

A great example of when the world is in a security dilemma where cooperation is unlikely is when looking at World War I. This security dilemma began because Britain and Germany were in a disagreement, due to the poor policies Germany enacted. This conflict began at the start of the nuclear weapons era, which greatly contributed to the security dilemma in place (Jervis, 1997). Neither wanted to go to war, but there were very high incentives to strike first due to the implications of being hit first with a nuclear attack. Because of the severe consequences of cooperating with only one state cooperating and disarming, while the other chooses to maintain their nuclear weapons, it would be irrational for either country to choose to cooperate and risk their security for the collective good. Inevitably these countries were forced into a war because the incentives made cooperation unfathomable.   

One way that World War I could have been avoided was if the incentives were shifted from needing to strike first by increasing arms to incentivizing the desire to protect themselves by increasing defenses. They were focused on furthering their nuclear technology, which posed a threat to the enemy, which caused conflict to be inevitable. To lower the arms race and need for war, incentivizing the increase in defense lessens the need for conflict, likely leading to a stalemate. If the countries incentivized improving technology for protecting against nuclear weapons, it would have lowered the likelihood of war. (Jervis, 1997) To further lessen the likelihood of war, the defensive development had to be distinguishable only for defense, and could not be mistaken as an offensive maneuver, because it could cause unnecessary mistrust between the states and cause an unnecessary chance of aggression. With the definitive shift in incentives, from increasing arms to improving their defensive technology World War I could have been avoided.