Relationship Between Mind And Body Research Paper

We are all very familiar with our own bodies and minds and how they operate, but do we ever think what the connection might be between the two and if there even is a real correlation between them? Where do we start to think about this topic and how can we figure out what the connection is between the body and mind? For Descartes, in Thomas Blackburn’s Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy, he uses a neurophysiological perspective to say that our physical transmissions or “pulls” of the nerves in our brain transmit signals to parts of our physical body, and allow for us to see, touch, taste, smell, or hear. Descartes sees these mental events as being distinct from physical events. He believes that, “Thoughts and experiences are modifications in one kind of stuff; movement and position belong to the other” (Blackburn 86). All of this leads to the subject of cartesian dualism: the view that mind and body are two separate substances. Through Descartes own research and understanding of cartesian dualism as well as John Locke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s views on the relationship between the mind and the body, I will argue for the truth of Leibniz’s position and why the physical and mental are closely related.

From Descartes' view, he believes that there are two separate kinds of properties which include the mental and physical, and that people can have both, they are just distinct from each other. This means that he believes the body and mind can coexist, they just are not completely intertwined with each other. Descartes believes that there is a separation between our thoughts and our bodily actions which makes him a “substance dualist.” Blackburn states that substance dualism is not entirely compulsory as one could also hold the belief that mental and physical properties are very different from each other but the organized body has them both. Blackburn uses an analogy to put this into clearer terms saying,  “after all, mass and velocity are two very different kinds of property, but projectiles have them both” (Blackburn 86). So what does this mean exactly and how can the physical and mental properties be so different from each other but still connected through the same body? Descartes leads us to a view summarized as the “ghost in a machine.” This view, held by Gilbert Ryle, explains that the events in our physical body are like events in the physical world, and events in the “ghostly” part or our mind, are completely different. Although these two realms may be completely distinct from each other, there still is a close correlation between how they can affect each other. For example, Descartes explains how sticking a pin in someone makes a physical change, but also causes a mental event of pain. Descartes also explains that the opposite of this is true as well; the mental event of experiencing a memory may also cause physical events such as blushing or groaning. Through these examples, we are able to see that as disconnected the realm of the physical and mental may be, there is still a correlation between the two since they coexist together in one body and cause effects on each other. As mentioned previously, this whole view of the mind and body being completely separate substances is called cartesian dualism, which we will dig into further later on.

To further learn about the relationship between the mind and the body, let’s take a look at the contradicting views of two famous philosophers: John Locke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Locke believes that we have “no clear and distinct idea of just what kinds of systems God might choose as suitable places for him to superadd consciousness” (Blackburn 98). Basically, Locke believes that mind and body connection when the brain produces something “entirely different,” our bodily sensations are “entirely obscure.” Blackburn tells us that Locke’s view is not too different from a doctrine known as “occasionalism.” Occasionalism stands on the fact that physical events do not strictly cause or bring out mental events at all but provides the occasions for God to insert mental events (Norton, class lecture, 9/8). This same view believes that physical events do not bring upon mental events but rather God inserts these specific mental events to match what we experience in our physical bodies. Basically, our bodies do not affect our minds at all according to this view. While Locke does not entirely say this, his view is pretty much saying the exact same thing. 

Leibniz is entirely opposed to Locke’s view and has his own separate view on the mind and body connection. In an passage from his New Essay, Leibniz writes in opposition to Locke's view saying, “It must not be thought that ideas such as those of colour and pain are arbitrary and that between them and their causes there is no relation or natural connection: it is not God's way to act in such an unruly and unreasoned fashion” (Blackburn 99). Leibniz disagrees with Locke as seen here, and believes that there is a resemblance of mind and body where one is in relation with the other. Leibniz even goes as far as to say, “(pain) might thoroughly resemble the motions which the pin causes in our body, and might represent them in the soul; and I have not the least doubt that it does” (Blackburn 100). As seen through these quotes, it is very clear where Leibniz stands on his viewpoint and how different his view is from Locke’s. Leibniz sees that there has to be some sort of rational connection between the mind and the body while Locke only sees it as God’s doing. 

To put these perceptions of the mind and body connection into different terms, let’s take a look at Blackburn’s depiction of “zombies and mutants.” Blackburn tells the reader that zombies look like us, behave like us, and react to certain things through human sensations the same way we do, but are not conscious. This zombie possibility shows that “consciousness is an extremely rare correlate of a complex system of brain and body” (Blackburn 88). According to this quote consciousness may be a way of proving the connection between mind and body. On the other hand, mutants look like us, behave like us, and react to things the same way human beings do, but unlike zombies, mutants are conscious. The events a mutant experiences may cause different mental events than we do which is what separates us from them. Events in the mutant’s consciousness may bear no relation to our minds whatsoever; so, what does all this mean? These possibilities prove the point that according to cartesian dualism, this could all be possible and there may not be any connection between the body and mind after all, but actually, the problem of zombies and mutants shows that there is something wrong with cartesian dualism. This all proves that the body and mind cannot be completely distinct from each other after all by using metaphysical logic and reasoning. Blackburn explains how if someone stubs their toe and reacts by shouting in pain, it is because they experienced something just like we do when we stub our toe. This also proves that what is known as the “argument from analogy to other minds,” where we use ourselves as a model to base others's mental and physical beings off of, can prove the whole zombie and mutant possibility to be impossible (Blackburn 94). 

To conclude this essay, I will argue my own position on the topic of cartesian dualism based off of Locke and Leibniz’s viewpoints on this issue. I believe that Leibniz is correct in his view and here is why. The zombie and mutant possibility and the argument from analogy to other minds basically prove that cartesian dualism cannot be true. We know there must be a connection between the mind and the body as Leibniz argues for. I agree with Leibniz’s point that God would not act in such an unreally and unreasonable fashion by inserting mental sensations in our brain according to bodily happenings, therefore, there must be a connection between the physical and the mental and a rather close correlation between the two for that matter. An opposition to this view would be Locke’s belief and the question of how we would know that our mental and physical are actually connected and that God doesn't insert mental reactions to certain physical experiences. Defending against this objection, I believe the fact that we can use ourselves as a model, basing everyone else off of our mind’s own reaction to pain or any other physical reaction basically proves that there is a direct correlation between the two, and since God created our bodies and minds to operate in this way from the beginning, it shoots down the objection that God himself just inserts these mental reactions everytime we experience something physically.  I also agree with Leibniz’s point that it would be unreasonable and not logical for God to insert certain reactions into us from what we experience physically. All of this, from my own view, proves that Leibniz’s position on cartesian dualism is true, and that there is a direct correlation between the mind and the body.