A Consensus of Richard Rorty and J.J Owens on Liberal Foundationalism (Philosophy Essay Sample)

Rortys assertion of an antifoundational liberal democracy is justified on a liberal democracy held together by a “social glue”. Owen suggests that this form of liberalism based on exclusion of faith is itself an established competing faith. Liberalism can exist outside the traditional bounds of religion such as Rorty proposed, however it is not without some form of social solidarity within liberalism itself. I propose that Owens critique suggests the social glue that Rorty uses cannot be without foundations. Inside extreme view of liberal anti foundationalism in opposition to traditional religious foundations leave his doubts on either side definitively. Rather, Owens criticisms of Rortys anti foundationalist argument could be considered most accurately as a more inclusive and adaptive version of foundationalism that is dependent on the assertions of the common ideas at the current time.  

Owen objects to the possibility of a society removed from faith that can be inclusive to people with strong connections to moral foundations. Rorty asserts that his social glue allows for everybody to have a access to freedoms as well as the potential for personal and social gain. He claims that liberal society can exist based solely on this common glue that bonds everybody together and allows for these “standard bourgeoisie freedoms”(Rorty 84). Owen challenges this loosely held together society based on no foundations. He claims that with “"no trace of divinity." that this goal, combined with Rorty's diminution of human rights, suggests that religious freedom would be less secure in a Rortian regime” (Owen Abstract). Rortys inclusionary thoughts are only possible when all higher sensitivity immoral thought is erased from public life. In turn Owen believes that this dedivinization of society threatens the freedoms that Rorty states the social glue will uphold.  

The example of a liberal ironist demonstrates that Owen's exclusionary ideas are problematic. Owen pointed out that “Ironism is defined by its opposition to metaphysics, which is not the same as freedom from metaphysics or from concern with the questions of metaphysics” (59). Owen is concerned that Rorty sees Ironism as a protection from foundations in liberal democracy and not the traditional definition of ironism that is the opposition of it. Although his own point on the definition of ironism maybe to be against religion, Rortys liberal ironist have a different intention. He maintains that “Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease” (introduction). The goal of liberal ironist is not to exclude religion from liberalism, but to consider all people outside of their moral foundationalism. Rorty sees remember ironism as a way to include people rather than how Owen considers it as an exclusionary group.  

Rorty has the optimistic view as liberal ironism existing outside of foundationalist thoughts. Owen argues that this is not freedom from religion but rather the exclusion of it. The goal of this liberalism is not to exclude people but rather to distance itself from exclusionary foundational practices. Owen considers the people as their religion whereas Rorty expresses this dualist possibility. People within the public sphere according to Rorty can still maintain freedoms privately and be included. Rodney allows for more people to be included even if their private thoughts are not. 

Rorty anti foundationalism Is based on human connection through their current instincts. Owen challenges its connection to liberalism on a foundational basis asserting that it is a competing faith. Liberal democracy claims to protect freedoms such as religion. Owen argues: 

“Liberalism stands or falls with its success in addressing, and not merely suppressing, the challenge posed by nonliberal religion. The implication of the claim that liberalism rests on faith is that liberalism has not thus succeeded. To state the difficulty most simply, it is impossible for liberalism to adjudicate rationally or impartially amongst the various faiths, as it claims to do, if it itself is one of the competing faiths” (Owen 2). 

The assertion here is that Rorty's liberal democracy is dependent on replacing traditional foundationalism with liberalism in the public sphere. This leads to the conclusion that liberalism cannot exist with competing faiths. Furthermore, the assumption is that liberalism is powerful enough that it will fill the gap of faiths. Liberalism would be overarching over all religions leaving it the only thing left in the public sphere. Rorty does not substantially distance itself from being foundational. Because of this oversight, Owen leaves doubt that liberalism can be more prominent over faith if it is itself a competing faith.  

Rorty objects to Kant and Nietzsche's ideas of human beings as rational, irrational, or metaphysical. Instead, he leans towards Freud's ideas of unconscious thought. He praises Freuds concept of “every human being as consciously or unconsciously acting out an idiosyncratic fantasy, we can see the distinctively human, opposed to animal, portion of each human life as the use for symbolic purposes of every particular person, object, situation, event, and word encountered in later life” (Rorty 36). The basis of this rationale is that each human life is responsible for itself and its actions and there is no greater purpose as many past philosophers have suggested. With this consideration It could be said that this insistence on unconscious thought is itself a foundation of human beings. If Rorty considers Freuds hypothesis of a more fluid purpose of human life, how is that any less foundational than the more traditional rational moral ideas of human nature? I would like to consider that Rortys insistence on a lack of foundation is itself a foundation.