Abortion and Stages of Fetal Development (Free Research Paper Example)

The question of whether abortion is morally permissible is undoubtedly one of the most controversial of the modern age. I believe there is another question that is equally as important, but is addressed less frequently.  That is, if it is at all morally permissible for an abortion to occur, at what stage in the fetus’ development does it become morally impermissible? Mark T. Brown attempts to answer this question by providing a definitive point in development that divides living human beings from others. Mirroring the definition of brain death, Brown states that a fetus is considered a living human when there is adequate somatic integration in the body (2019, 1035). The earliest it could be argued this occurs is approximately 9 weeks after implantation. Jeff McMahan disagrees with Brown’s solution on multiple levels: McMahan concludes that it becomes morally impermissible for an abortion to occur when the fetus develops the neuronal connections necessary for consciousness (2002). Furthermore, McMahan bases his conclusion not on science, but a kind of contractualism. Brown would likely believe that the range of time McMahan’s definition concludes is permissible for an abortion to occur is not stringent enough and requires too much from the fetus. I, however, find validity in the difference in my ability to relate with a 20-week old fetus that can feel pain and with a 9-week old zygote. 

In 1981, the President’s Commission on medical ethics determined that the definition of death is a lack of integration between the major organ systems. Similarly, to be considered alive one must be able to regulate “dedicated homeostatic mechanisms that maintain physiological homeostasis conducive to cellular metabolism,” (2019, 1036) also known as somatic integration. Brown takes this criterion and uses it to define the beginning of one's life rather than the end: the establishment of somatic integration in an organism is indicative of the beginning of a human being’s life. Therefore, if a fetus exhibits somatic integration, which entails a life-regulation internal control (LRIC) system, it is considered a living human being and is entitled to the rights of one, including the right not to be unjustly killed. Nine weeks after implantation a fetus has developed its first organ system: the circulatory system. At this point, it has a four-chambered heart pumping blood, which both transports what is necessary for cellular metabolism throughout the body, and is a carrier for signal molecules, qualifying it for LRIC system status (2019, 1040). Since this is the earliest point in a fetus’ development in which it is somatically integrated, it is also the earliest point in which it could be considered morally impermissible for an abortion to occur on the grounds that killing another human being is impermissible. Notably, ⅔ of abortions in the U.S. occur before this time (2019, 1041). 

  McMahan places little value in definitions for a living human being that are based in biology, such as the somatic integration definition of life, in his work (2002, 3-4). It would be difficult to argue that a zygote that maintains its own homeostasis is not alive, and even harder to deny that the fetus is genetically unique and human. But McMahan doesn’t see much importance in defining when something literally becomes a living human being, rather when it becomes indistinguishable from the person that it would grow to be. Here a form of contractualism plays a role. McMahan believes that in order for it to be impermissible to have/perform an abortion at a given point on the grounds that killing other humans is impermissible, the fetus must be something we can feel a sort of equivalence with. It begs the question. Did I begin to exist when the fertilized egg with my DNA was implanted? Or did I begin when I developed four chambers in my heart? Science struggles to properly address this, but luckily the answer to when in a fetus’ development you or I would have begun to exist does not rely on science. 

McMahan invokes the Embodied Mind Account, according to which we are not equivalent to any human organism, but rather that we only begin to exist when personal identity has been made possible. They then determine that the criteria of personal identity is “the continued existence and functioning…of enough of the same brain to be capable of generating consciousness or mental activity,” (2002, 68) (a conservative estimate for this is twenty weeks after implantation, when the neuronal connections in the fetus have developed enough to make consciousness possible). Therefore, we begin to exist only when the fetus is capable of consciousness. 

McMahan makes sure not to depict 20 weeks as a point a at which an abortion is always permissible before and always impermissible after. He instead suggests that 20 weeks is the earliest an abortion could be considered immoral on the grounds that killing another human is immoral. And from this point on, the abortion becomes gradually and slowly more impermissible because it does more harm to the fetus’ time-relative interest. The time-relative interest account suggests that killing can be more or less wrong, depending on the strength of the victim’s time-relative interest in continuing to live. This interest is qualified using the amount of future good the individual can anticipate and the strength of the relationship between an individual and its future self. Developed fetuses have a high potential for future good, but a very weak connection to their future self as they lack “psychological architecture–no beliefs, desires, or dispositions of character,” (2002, 275). These attributes are developed throughout a fetus’ development, gradually increasing their time-relative interest and making it more impermissible for an abortion to be performed.

Brown points out that some may view the development of the nervous system as the first instance of an adequate LRIC system in a fetus, but does not discuss much why there is a preference for the circulatory system over the nervous system. I speculate that Brown would object to McMahan’s conclusion that consciousness, and therefore the necessary neuronal connections, be required of a fetus to be awarded human status. This would be on the basis that it requires more from the fetus than is required of some postnatal humans to be considered someone alive. For example, humans with severe mental challenges, extremely premature babies, or comatose individuals can be seen as incapable of the self-consciousness McMahan requires fetuses to have and it would be difficult to argue that these people were not living human beings with the right not to be killed unjustly (2019, 1041). 

Moral contractualism essentially explains that we do not engage in ‘morally wrong’ actions because of the reality that we could be on the receiving end. I see this reflected in McMahan’s argument in that he believes, “It is therefore essential to determine whether, in killing an embryo, a fetus, or an individual in an irreversible coma, one would be killing an entity of a sort that you and I once were, or might become.” It suggests that the impermissibility of abortion lies in the fact that the ‘victim’ could have, or could be, yourself. This follows, as most would consider it impermissible to kill someone with severe dementia, despite not meeting the consciousness requirement, because they could one day have severe dementia. Furthermore, we could one day be comatose, or become mentally challenged after an accident, and we could have once been a premature baby and that’s why they have the moral statuses of human beings. But McMahan establishes that before 20 weeks, a fetus is not something one can reasonably identify with. It is important to note that personal identity, or consciousness, is being used as the determining factor because it is what’s required for a relation between a fetus and a person. Therefore, if a relation can still be established, a consciousness is not strictly necessary for a human moral status. 

 Brown’s primary conclusion is that nine weeks is the earliest a fetus could be considered a living human and his rationale relies heavily on the official criteria for brain death in postnatal humans. This results in the somatic integration definition of life, which states that the earliest a fetus or zygote could be considered a living human being is nine weeks after implantation.  McMahan does not directly disagree, but rather proposes that it is more important when an equivalence can be established between a fetus and the person they could become. He concludes that the earliest this could be established is 20 weeks, when the neuronal connections can foster consciousness.